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Abstract 
 
Export Processing Zones are geographical enclaves that have legally been excepted from the 
country´s normal customs barriers and other constraining legislations. Malaysia has used 
them to foster its manufacturing industries, particularly the electronic sector. They are 
intended to attract foreign exchange, create employment and increase exports. In a longer 
perspective they are also supposed to have indirect effects through the creation of backward 
linkages, transfer of knowledge and positive catalytic effects on the host country.  
 
The aim of this essay is to evaluate the EPZs’ impact on Malaysia and see if their objectives 
have been reached and what other effects they might have had. This essay is specifically 
focused on recent developments and what effect the increasing product fragmentation, the 
Asian crisis and the new regional free trade area (AFTA) have had on Malaysia and on the 
electronic industry in particular. This study shows that the EPZ has been a success when it 
comes to direct effects, but that the indirect effects are still relatively limited and concentrated 
to certain areas (Penang). It also concludes that the Malaysian EPZ will probably diminish in 
importance if the mentioned trend continues. 
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This study looks deeper into the phenomenon of export processing zones (EPZs), which have 
become more important for development in the developing world. The interest in these has 
been growing because of some countries’ successful path to industrialisation through them. 
The attractiveness for many countries lies in the fact that they do not have to change their 
overall trading policy. One of these successful countries that have implemented the EPZ as 
part of their general development policy is Malaysia, which has used this in their Export 
Promotion policies since the early 70s. They have used several incentives to attract 
multinational companies (MNC), with the EPZ as the most important one. However, there is 
not only the issue of attracting foreign direct investments (FDI) anymore, because the main 
focus of their policy since the 80s has been to obtain technological know-how and create 
linkage effects. The electrical industries in Malaysia are the dominant industry in the EPZ 
(and in the country since the EPZ accounts for a crucial part of Malaysia’s overall growth) 
and the main target of FDI. And because of this, it is the natural industry to focus on when 
studying this development. The MNCs are supposed to bring something more than just the 
simple importation of capital (and solving the unemployment problems). They are supposed 
to develop the domestic industry and thereby increase competitiveness on the international 
market. It is, however, doubtful if Malaysia has experienced these effects.  
 
This study aims to find out what effects the EPZs have had on the Malaysian economy: both 
the direct and the indirect effects. The main focus is on development since the Asian crisis in 
1997, but in order to understand the present you also have to know something about the past. 
 
1.1 Method and disposition 
 
This study is of a descriptive character and may have some limits due to the limited 
availability of data. It will mainly focus on the economic considerations. The rest of this 
report I have structured as follows: Section 2 describes the general context of EPZs, 
objectives and theories around them. In the third section the future of the EPZs is discussed 
regarding some worldwide trends. In the fourth section Malaysia’s industrial policy is 
examined and labour developments are exposed. In the fifth section and sixth section the 
direct and indirect effects of the EPZs are analyzed. 
 
  1 




According to the World Bank, an export processing zone (EPZ) is “an industrial estate, 
usually a fenced in area of 10 to 300 hectares that specialises in manufacturing for exports. It 
offers free trade conditions and a liberal regulatory environment”. 
1 However, this definition 
is a bit narrow since there are several examples of EPZs in developing countries that are not 
geographically constrained to industrial estates, Mauritius and Tunisia are two examples. In 
other zones companies are also allowed to sell their output to the host country instead of re-
exporting it, (Dominican Republic and Mexico are good examples where they are allowed to 
export between 20-40 percent to the domestic market). EPZs aim to attract foreign capital and 
exploit the comparative advantage that developing countries usually share, namely cheap 
labour. 
2 In other words the industries that develops within these zones are labour-intensive 
ones like the electronic and textile branch. The detailed advantages offered in different EPZs 
vary greatly between countries, but here are the some of the main characteristics: 
3
-  Unlimited, duty-free imports of raw materials, intermediate goods and equipment 
necessary for production. 
-  Liberal labour laws and restrictions on unionisation to keep wages down. 
-  Generous and long term tax holidays. 
-  Better infrastructure and service (compared to the host country). Some countries also 
subsidise utilities and rental rates. 
-  Industrial regulations are relaxed, such as restriction on repatriation on profits, foreign 
ownership of firms and employment of foreign staff. 
Although EPZs are a recent phenomenon there has been an impressive growth of EPZs as 
they have multiplied by five and provided job for over 40 million (see table 2.1).  
 
Table 2.1: The Evolution of EPZs Over Time      
         
   1975 1986 1995 1997 2002 
No. of Countries with EPZ   25 47 73 93 116 
No. of EPZ  79 176 500  845  3´000 
Employment (millions)  0.8 1.9 n.a. 22.5 43 
 Which comes from China  n.a n.a n.a 18 30 
Source: ILO (2003) p 2      
                                                 
1 Madani, (1999) p 12 
2 Most EPZ is located in the third world, 48 percent in Latin America and 42 percent in Asia. Kusago 
& Tzannatos, (1998) p 5 
3 Madani, (1999) p 15 
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2.2 Objectives of a trade free zone 
 
The general objective for the EPZ is to promote non-traditional manufacturing exports 
through MNC investments. More specifically, to attract foreign investments, to provide jobs 
to alleviate unemployment, export more non traditional manufacturing goods and obtain 
foreign exchange earnings. But there is also an important demonstration effect that hopefully 
will eventually be able to develop the domestic industry’s international competitiveness. 
These indirect effects might be difficult to measure “but in the long run they might very well 
constitute the most important benefits of EPZs”.
4 5 One of these indirect effects is the 
knowledge spillover effect that can take place in many different ways; local firms improving 
productivity by copying technology, former workers start-up on their own and so on. Another 
indirect effect is the backward linkage, when the companies within the EPZ begin to buy 
more input from the host country.  
 
Forward linkages may also arise if exports are allowed to the local market (which they 
generally are not). This may induce attempts to use these products in some other new activity 
and thereby increase competition that will promote efficiency.  Theses effects will occur not 
only if local firms provide training and assistance to their local suppliers but also for the 
simple reason that the local suppliers are forced to meet the higher quality standards and 
stricter delivery routines of the MNC (compared to the already existing local companies). 
Johansson also claims that there is a catalytic effect stimulating local firms to engage in export 
activities to the firms within the zone and in an external effect that spills over to the domestic 
economy and firms.
  6 This effect may also influence the trade policy regime of the host 
country. Because of the nature of the industries (low cost, labour intensive, low-tech) located 
in the EPZ there has been some serious doubt about these effects since “firms tend to keep 
research activities and high end production processes at home”.
7 Generally, you can say that 
the lower the gap between the technologies used in the zone and the domestic economy, the 




                                                 
4 Quote from Lundgren (2000) p 10 
5 For further information about indirect effects read Madani (1999) p 30-34 
6 Johansson (1994) 
7 Quote from Warr in UNCTAD (1993) p 22 
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2.3 The EPZ and the overall trade policy of the host country 
 
In order to understand why countries apply this “second best alternative” (assuming free trade 
is the best) we have to look for motives for why they are created in the first place.
8 Madani 
distinguished between four interlocking goals: 
-  To consider the EPZ as a first step for further wider reforms in the economy. The EPZ 
has in this circumstance a limited life span and phases out when the host country has 
implemented systematic trade, macroeconomic and exchange rate reforms. Both 
Taiwan and South Korea fit into this category. 
-  Tunisia is a prime example of the second view of Madani´s terminology. These 
countries consider the EPZ to be a way of obtaining much needed foreign exchange 
and partly alleviating some underemployment. However there are no plans to further 
liberalise the economy so therefore they have left the EPZ in enclave production and 
actually delayed wider trade policy reforms. 
-  A third view is to see the EPZ as a testing Zone for a market economy, mainly for the 
former socialistic countries (like China). In these areas new production, labour and 
financial relationships and dynamics were introduced and evaluated before they were 
introduced on a larger scale in the host economy.   
-  The last option comes from those countries that have a disappointing experience with 
trade and macro policy reforms. They create the zones mainly to be able to match their 
neighbouring countries´ incentives in order to attract FDI. 
 
2.4 Prerequisite for successful EPZs in Asia 
 
A lot of things that can go wrong that may help to explain the poor performance of some of 
the zones. According to Johansson this includes “poor planning and design, abundance of red-
tape procedures, insufficient and inefficient promotion, lack of government policy, 
interventions and finally pure mismanagement”. 
9 It is therefore important to also look at 
some relatively satisfactory examples and see if there is any possible conclusion to be drawn. 
The best pair of examples probably comes from South Korea and Taiwan. Firstly, they had 
already formulated an export oriented national strategy, with realistic exchange rates, a 
partially liberalised trade regime and low inflation. Secondly, the state played its role as a 
developmentalist state through strong interventions. With a stick and carrot strategy it was 
                                                 
8 Madani, WB (1999) p 17-18 
9 Johansson (1994) p 2117 
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able to discipline the private sector by imposing performance standards, providing subsidies 
and prohibiting trade unions, but most important it allowed the private sector to grow. 
Thirdly, they were lucky with the timing of the first zones established, so they could reap the 
full advantage when the developed countries reallocated their firms in the early 70s and 
opened up their markets for manufactured products 
10 (see section 3.1). 
 
2.5 Theories around EPZs, and how to evaluate them 
 
There has been some development when it comes to how economists look at the EPZ. This is 
due to the strong growth in the number of zones (and with that an increased interest among 
economists) and because of the existing economic theories that provide inadequate tools to 
deal with them. Three different ways to evaluate the zones have been developed, the neo-
classical, the cost-benefit analysis and the new growth theory. I am going to present them in 
the order they were developed. First, there were no specific tools to evaluate the zones so the 
economists applied neoclassical analysis to deal with them. The first studies 
11 were fairly 
limited in scope and did not take into account some of the most important reasons for 
establishing EPZs, such as promoting employment and attracting foreign knowledge. They 
used Heckscher-Ohlin´s two factor (labour and capital), two goods and two country model 
and focused on the final price of the good after the removal of tariffs. They further assumed 
that the country was relatively labour abundant and when (or if) international capital came in 
it would focus their resources towards more capital-intensive production according to the 
Rybczynski theorem;
 12 hence it would work against the country’s comparative advantage and 
reduce the country’s welfare. Later complementary theories
13 changed this conclusion by 
emphasising the abolition of tariffs on intermediate products, reduction of taxes on repatriated 
profits and countries that experience employment problems. Although the model has moved 
toward more realistic assumptions regarding the EPZ it still lacks explanationary power.
 14 
Warr recognising these flaws developed the cost-benefit analysis. He is also relatively 
sceptical towards EPZs and although he recognises it can be a useful instrument in the early 
stages of development, he questions whether these limited positive effects could be obtained 
in a more cost effective way. Basically you are supposed to calculate all costs and benefits 
                                                 
10 Wu & Amirahmadi (1995) p 836 
11 This group includes Hamada (1974), Hamilton & Svensson (1982) 
12 Employment creation is one of the major targets for the EPZ, so the Rybczynski theorem might not 
be the best tool as it assumes full employment to start with 
13 Leading theorists here would be Miyagiwa (1986) and Young (1987) 
14 The theory explanation is based on Johansson (1994) p 394  
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associated with the zone in a static way. Warr also carried one of the first pioneer studies 
associated this school, and the results are summarised in table 2.2: 
 
  Table 2.2 : Cost-Benefit Analysis of selected EPZ:s   
      
Name of the zone  Bataan  Masan  Penang 
Millions of US $ 1982  (Philippines) (South Korea)  (Malaysia) 
Employment Creation  59 39 111 
Foreign Exchange Earnings  72 65 94 
Tax Revenue  11 18 10 
Domestic Suppliers  3 16 28 
Infrastructure costs   -219 -85 -47 
Other costs  -151 -13 -53 
Overall Net Benefit   -225 40 143 
      










Madani concludes that the main drawback of this approach is the lack of adequate data. 
Assumptions regarding rates of returns, social discount rate and social benefits may easily be 
questioned and are hard to obtain.
 15 Another drawback pointed out by Johansson is that this 
method emphasize direct effects such as export earnings and job creation but the more 
dynamic gains such as technology transfers and demonstration effects are assumed to be of 
minor importance. 
16 The new growth theory, which has recently appeared, deals with some 
of these flaws and therefore is better suited to handle the dynamic gains of the EPZ. In this 
model the demonstration effect coming from foreign enterprises is the important thing as they 
can work as a “catalyst which initiates and transmits the export supply response in the host 
country”.
  17  The MNCs are also important because they already have an established 
international network, so joint-ventures with them can give the local entrepreneur much better 
access to the world market. They are supposed to stimulate trade-oriented reforms in the 
whole country if the experience becomes successful through mutual interaction between the 
zone and the domestic economy. The obvious drawback is that these indirect effects are hard 
to measure, partly because they are not tangible in nature and it is even more difficult to 




                                                 
15 Madani (1999) 
16 Johansson (1994)  p 395 
17 Johansson (1994)  p 396 
  6 
3. International product fragmentation and EPZ 
 
3.1 The Asian point of view 
 
The process of outsourcing relatively labour-intensive component production to developing 
countries has been going on since the late 60s and only seems to be increasing. This 
international product fragmentation allows the production process to be sliced up so that each 
stage can be reallocated to where the intensively used production factor is cheapest. The 
intensity of required factors of the given segment and the relative prices of those factors in 
comparison with their productivity will determine which country produces the components. 
This outsourcing process was started by American companies but was soon followed by 
European and Japanese companies in the 70s and by the Newly Industrialised Countries 
18 
(NIC) more recently. They were usually (at least in the case of the NICs) a response to 
domestic wage increases causing these countries to begin setting up subsidiaries abroad. The 
first industries established were in the garment and electronics fields, but the latter industry 
came to completely dominate the component-driven fragmentation trade.
 19 Since the East and 
South Asian regions are world-leading in this sector it is not surprising to see that it is here 
that the fragmentation of production has gone furthest. 
20
 
Some observers thought that this leading role could be adversely affected by the integration of 
some new emerging countries (namely Mexico and East European countries) because of their 
proximity to the industrialised countries (closer to the markets and final assembly activities) 
and their low wages by regional standards. 
21 However, the wages still remain low compared 
to these competitors (Mexico is represents them here, to be compared with the other countries 
within the same group) despite the rapid industrialisation that has almost doubled their wages 
(see table 3.1). Moreover, significant differences have created a regional hierarchy that 
provided the basis for the expansion of intra-regional product sharing system within the 
region.
  
22 Above all it is Japan which obtains cheap products from the region and takes care 
of the lions where of the more sophisticated steps such as Research and Development (R&D) 
                                                 
18 The NIC countries are South Korea, Taiwan, Singapore and HongKong. 
19 Four electronic sub-sectors namely office machinery (SITC 759), telecommunication equipment 
(SITC 764), electrical circuits (SITC 772 and household electrical equipment (SITC 776) have more 
than an 80 percent market share. The data in this fragmentation section comes from the Standard 
International Trade Classification which is based on UN trade data obtained from Athukorala (2003) 
20 In the ASEAN 55 percent of the manufacturing trade consists of parts and components compared to 
30 and 21.4 percent in NAFTA and EU Athukorala (2003)  p 30 
21 Athukorala (2003)  p 13 
22 To clarify this hierarchy I have chosen to use table 3.1 with four different groups depending on economical 
progress and combined with the text the table will reveal which countries belong to each group. 
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and final assembly. It has a trade surplus with all the countries in the region and also uses 
them as a manufacturing base to be able to export to third country markets (to curb trade 
restrictions). The second group is the NIC countries that has moved up the technology ladder 
and shifted from assembly activities to final goods production. These newcomers have 
enjoyed substantial agglomeration effects. They are not so vulnerable to the fluctuations in the 
world markets since their foreign companies have been much more embedded in the host 
country and respond more sluggishly to relative cost changes. 
 
The third group is the second generation of industrialised countries which is the group that is 
most dependent on the fragmentation-based production, 74, 54 and 47 percent for Indonesia, 
Malaysia and Thailand, respectively of the total manufacturing export comes from trade in 
components. They have been able to upgrade to some extent but they are still dependent on 
being able to develop their dynamic comparative advantage since there are a lot of countries 
which are able to compete with just low wages. The final groups consist of countries like 
China, Vietnam and India, but probably also most developing countries that participate in the 
world market to any extent. They compete with very low wages and industrialised countries 
continue to reallocate affiliates there, but even here the wages have increased substantially as 
can be seen in the table 3.1. One important misconception worth noting of here is that China 
does not seem to push out any other countries´ opportunities by too big expansion in exports. 
On the contrary China´s integration into the regional production network has gone well 
(export growth has been within the overall increase for newcomers). 
23
 
Table 3.1: Annual Compensation per Worker in Manufacturing 1990-1998 ($ per month) 
           
   1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 
Canada  3156 3343 3350 3432 3589 3553 3570 3506 3413
Europe  3074 3283 3600 3388 3503 3724 3728 3616 3618
Japan  3808 4108 4373 4902 5724 5934 5849 5343 5054
                        
Korea  1134 1449 1346 1635 1743 2059 2313 2351 2007
Taiwan   1162 1337 1639 1638 1695 1914 n.a 2032 1970
                        
Mexico  579 666 765 843 854 749 746 831  n.a
Malaysia  387 420 488 570 573 569 665 657 652
Thailand  343 428 502 569 508 523 568 508 472
Philippines  314 370 467 499 565 580 647 623 598
                        
China  178 217 213 317 293 395 428 513 533
India  348 315 323 335 318 427 463 461 474
Source: Survey of U.S. FDI Abroad,Department of Commerce, US, Athukorala (2003) p 26
                                                 
23 Athukorala (2003) p 12 
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3.2 Reasons for the fragmentation trend 
 
At an early stage low production costs just were not enough of a reason for MNCs to locate 
their production in a developing country because the trade barriers and transaction costs were 
too high. What started this trend was the gradual decrease in tariff and transport costs that 
made it more profitable to outsource specific product segments. However, this process has 
been reinforced by several interlocking factors that has enabled it to grow even faster. Firstly, 
the rapid advancement in production technology that has made it possible to slice up the value 
chain into finer components, this has in turn enabled individual countries to specialise in 
smaller segments which is easier than making the whole product from scratch. Secondly, 
technology innovation in communication and transport has improved speed, efficiency and 
economy in coordinating geographically dispersed parts of the production process. Thirdly, 
liberalisation reforms in both home and host countries have removed barriers to trade and 
investments. These factors have enhanced the price competitiveness and enabled scale 
economies, which in turn have resulted in market expansion. 
24 This process has been most 
pronounced in labour intensive industries because in high technology industries the proximity 
to the main market is much more important. They are also more dependent on external scale 
economics so they can benefit from company clusters (such as Silicon Valley) that may lead 
to agglomeration and specialisation effects. 
25  
 
3.3 Policy Implications  
 
The fragmentation process that favours outsourcing of labour-intense industries to developing 
countries in general and EPZs in particular may result in a conflict of interest of static and 
dynamic industries. In the short run it may make sense to attract industries that use simple 
technology and require little skill. But this kind of industry does not transfer any technology 
or create any learning effect. To obtain this the production has to be upgraded, become more 
sophisticated and less labour consuming. In this perspective Lundgren argues that conflicts 
between static and dynamic objectives may occur in the EPZ. 
26 This problem will be more 
serious in the second generation of industrialising countries since they are much more 
dependent on FDI. However, there may not always be a contradiction between short and long 
term objectives since the country will only be able to climb the technology ladder by starting 
from the bottom and developing their comparative advantage. 
                                                 
24 Athukorala (2003) p 5 
25 Lundgren (2000) p 15 
26 Lundgren (2000) p 16-17 
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Since the electronic and electrical (E & E) industry is characterized by rapid innovation and 
continual change there is little risk that the industry will be automated (which some observers 
fear), and it will therefore continue to expand and provide countries with opportunities to find 
niches in export oriented production. Another important thing to remember for governments 
wanting to attract this trade is that since the products cross borders many times, even low tariffs 
will be magnified and that could be crucial in an industry with thin margins. 
27
 
3.4 AFTA and the fragmentation trend effects on EPZs 
 
The AFTA agreement was first signed at a ministers´ meeting in Kuala Lumpur in January 1992 
and it established a time schedule for phasing out tariff barriers (called Common Effective 
Preferential Tariff). Because of the Asian crisis this schedule has been postponed several times but 
is due to be carried out in 2008. The aim of this free trade agreement is to eliminate intra-regional 
tariffs, attract foreign direct investments and improve the efficiency and competitiveness of local 
manufacturing in the ASEAN countries. 
28The outcome of the establishment of this free trade area 
(FTA) is hard to predict but the general theory on FTA states that the establishment of FTA will be 
positive if the industry within it is competing with the same goods (like the electronic sector in 
SouthEast Asia). Another important factor deciding whether the FTA will be successful is the size 
of the trade between the involved countries (total size of the trade in the area, so the EU will have 
greater chances for success than smaller African unions for example. The more internal trade 
opposed to external trade will also have a beneficial impact). It might look like fragmentation 
based trade will dominate the area (competing structure) but if one looks at trade partners for the 
ASEAN countries one can observe that over 60 percent of the final exports goes to countries 
outside the ASEAN.
 29 This implies that extra regional trade is much more important for continued 
strong growth, which in turn suggests that the trend of increasing product fragmentation will 
benefit more from global cooperation through organizations like WTO and APEC than regional 
ones. 
30 The effect on EPZs is a bit contradictional as an FTA will remove some of the incentives 
to invest in the EPZ since the whole FTA will be a tax free area. Some companies will surely be 
reallocated to other low wage countries within the FTA, but this may be compensated for by other 
foreign companies that might try to establish themselves here to circumvent the external trade 
restrictions. Besides the EPZ will probably still have an advantage over non EPZ areas because of 
more practical matters such as access to adequate infrastructure and administration services.
                                                 
27 Athukorala (2003) p 8 
28 ASEAN 
29 Athukorala (2003) p 33 
30 Athukorala (2003) p 20 
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4. Emergence and design of the Malaysian EPZs 
 
4.1 Industrial strategies and the emergence of EPZs 
 
After Malaysia gained independence in 1957 it continued to pursue the same laissez-faire 
policies as the British had done before them, which meant their policies were not 
characterised by very high protection or strong state interventions. Not until a World Bank 
trade mission visit in 1963 did Malaysia start to rely heavily on tariff and non-tariff protection 
to promote infant industries. This early industrialization enabled Malaysia to diversify its 
economy and reduce the excessive dependence on imported consumer goods. The limited 
success of import substitution, coupled with the small domestic market which had become 
saturated by the mid 60s, forced them to make a switch to a more export-oriented 
industrialisation.  The continuously  high unemployment and the ethnical conflict in 1969 
provided justification for a more active role of the state. It launched the National Economic 
Policy (NEP), whose objectives were to eradicate poverty and address imbalances between 
ethnical groups. Recognising that Malaysia severely lacked the technology, manpower and 
capital to undergo industrialisation, the government created lucrative incentive schemes for 
foreign direct investment, particular through the launch of the EPZs (for detailed information 
about the incentives see below). These incentives attracted leading international firms that 
spurred growth in the 70s, but the Zones also widened the gap to the rest of the economy as 
little integration between the sectors occurred.  
 
This dualistic structure with few linkages, combined with the great dependency on a narrow 
range of manufacturing products, led the government to embark on a more aggressive plan to 
develop a Korean styled heavy industrial programme. This industrialisation programme 
targeted (through increased protection) large scale, capital-intensive projects (including steel, 
machinery, petrochemicals and cars) which all had a significant comparative disadvantage in 
the short and medium run, high technical barriers to entry and long learning periods. 
31 This 
was financed by heavy increases in public expenditures 
32, which combined with falling 
commodity prices, a slowdown in electronics exports and a rise in imports, (especially of 
heavy industry and infrastructural items), badly affected the investment and employment 
climate. With the recession in 1985 the government decided to move towards greater 
                                                 
31 However the emulation of Japan and Korea probably failed because the high protection in these 
industries was not matched by effective monitoring and appraisal as it had been in those cases. 
32 They increased from 300 million RM 1978-80 to 900 in 1982 to culminate with 1,500  in 1984,  Alavi  p 42 
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emphasis of export orientation by introducing the Industrial Master Plan (IMP).  Many of the 
old methods (from the first round of export promotion) were used but they were made more 
generous. Among the more important ones were the relaxation of foreign equity conditions, 
extension of tax relief’s and subsidised investments loans. 
33 Most incentives were tied to 
technological deepening, exports and domestic sourcing of inputs. These changes in policy 
and external events that strongly depreciated RM against their major trading partners (which 
of course made Malaysia more competitive) helped attract massive amounts of FDI which 
spurred exports of manufacturing export. The development was so good that it could be 
argued that the incentives were too excessive when the economy saw signs of overheating 
(such as labour shortage and higher wages) in the early 90s. At that time the government 
became more focused on attracting higher value-added and technology intense operations, so 
the structural change was addressed through the launch of the Action Plan for Industrial 
Technology Development (APITD) and Second Industrial Plan (IMP2) (for further 
information see section 4.3). The technology advancement was encouraged through new 
arrangements like the Malaysian Industry-Government High Technology (MIGHT) in 1993 
and the Multimedia Super Corridor (MSC) in 1997.  
 
Table 4.1: Industrial strategies and trade orientation in Malaysia, 1957-2004 
 
Phases   Trade orientation   Period of dominance    Policy instruments 
 
First round of import substitution    1957-1970  Import  substitution
      Domestic market orientation 
First round export promotion  1970-1980  Free Trade Zones 
      New Economic Policy 
     Industrial  Coordination  Act 
Second round of import substitution  1980-1985  Heavy industries program 
Second round of export promotion  1985 - 2004  Industrial  Master  Plan
     Promotion of Investment Act 




Source: Rasiah (2002a) p 2 
                                                 
33 For an extensive review of the increased incentives that were extended through this period see 
Rasiah (2002a), from where all the statements and statistics in this section are obtained. 
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4.2 The history of the EPZs 
 
The first export-oriented factories that were established when the first EPZ opened up in the 
early 70s were American electronic industries.
34 These are striking facts in two ways, because 
in EPZs it is usually the pioneering industry (the initial big investor) that later becomes the 
dominating one, as the EPZ usually has a tendency of breeding a monoculture.
35 So even 
though electronics is not the only industry in the EPZ it is the dominating one; in other words 
it is the industry to focus on when studying the Malaysian EPZ (and the whole economy for 
that matter since it has become the biggest manufacturing employer, see table 4.3). The other 
striking fact is the American presence. Unlike the NIC whose economies have been powered 
by local owned corporations, Malaysia has to rely on MNC and FDI. The aim with the zones 
was to attract foreign investment and promote manufacturing exports as a part of its New 
Economic Policy (NEP), and to provide urban industrial jobs for predominantly rural Malays 
(which is important to understand while evaluating them).  
 
The incentives given to the foreign owned companies that invested in the zones were the 
traditional ones. The most important being pioneer status, tax holiday, investment and 
reinvestment tax allowance. 
36 Additional restrictions were placed on unionisation in pioneer 
industries to ensure labour stability in the early years.  Other good reasons for MNCs to invest 
in the EPZ were the political and economic stability, the good infrastructure and the English 
speaking labour force. These, along with an aggressive investment promotion mission already 
got the industry to prosper during the 70s with an annual growth rate that averaged 13.3 
percent. The industry grew very fast during both the 70s and 80s when it came to export 
earnings, employment and attraction of FDI. The Electronic industry can now be argued to be 
the main engine of growth in the country’s economy. Over 400 MNCs have been attracted to 
the zones and around 71.4 percent of the country’s manufacturing exports comes from this 
industry (1995). The most remarkable success story inside the electronic industry is the 
growth of the semiconductor industry that in 1995 constituted nearly 9.7 percent of the 
world’s total export, or about 38.0 percent of the total electronic export from Malaysia. 
37
                                                 
34 Fairchild and Intel set up assembly factories in Pedang, Ismail (2001) p 8 
35 More info on why they breed an industrial monoculture see UNCTAD (1993) p 13  
36 For detailed description of incentives see the end of this chapter under principal incentives in section 4.6 
37 The statistics in this EPZ section comes from Ismail (2001) 
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4.3 Employment and skills 
 
The electronic sector experienced a rapid employment development during the 90s which more 
than doubled employment in the sector to 400,000 from 1992 to 2000, but since then 
employment has contracted somewhat (see table 5.1). To this you have to add the indirect 
employment generated by their activities, such as supply of inputs and services which 
conservatively counted should be around 100,000. Cling & Letilly, however, estimate that the 
multiplication effect is between 0.25 and 2. 
38 Due to the exhaustion of labour reserves the 
overall unemployment rate fell from 6.1 to 2.5 percent between 1990 and 1997. This 
development has also raised wages (more so than in competing countries, see table 3.1) which, 
combined with increased competition from low cost sites such as China and the Philippines, in 
turn emerged because of improvements in infrastructure and political stability. The scarce 
labour supply forced Malaysia to temporarily import low educated labour from Indonesia and 
Bangladesh, which at the time accounted for about 15-25 percent of the total labour force. But 
this policy has gradually been transformed, which was highlighted after the crisis when 
350,000 illegal workers were deported.  However, this policy change already started with the 
launch of the Action Plan for Industrial Technology Development in 1990 and the IMP 2 in 
1995 when the policy became more focused on industrial deepening, clustering and a shifting 
to higher value activities. 
39 After the crisis Malaysia also took steps to liberalise conditions for 
manufacturing FDI which had fled. This increased the import rate (see table 5.2). The industry 
has also become more capital-intensive and more knowledge based which may help to explain 










                                                 
38 Cling & Letilly (2001) p 17 
39 Rasiah (2002) p 17 
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However Malaysia has had serious trouble upgrading its technology capabilities to respond to 
these changes (despite all the efforts). 
40 Primary and secondary education has always been 
above the global mean although it has fallen slightly lately.
  41 But what has restricted 
Malaysia’s capabilities to drive innovations and upgrade the economy is the very weak supply 
of R&D 
42, scientist and engineers 
43 and the lack of progress in this area.  
Rasiah recognise this fact: 
 
“Overcoming the human capital shortfalls will require institution building which will, 
in turn, require a large commitment of government funding, local political leadership, 
and industry education institution partnerships to develop the skills required to make 
the transition”. 
 
This problem could also be mitigated through better incentives for Malaysians educated 
abroad (which seems unlikely due to bad incentives) and/or a looser immigration policy (as 
mentioned before it has been tightened) which has helped other industrialised countries to 
overcome this supply gap. Although the high-tech human capital supply is not enough to 
satisfy the growing demand, the government’s aggressive strategy focused on expanding 
technical capabilities is reflected in the increasing enrolment rates and the shifting towards 
more technical and science educated people (see table 4.2).  
 
Table 4.2: Enrolment for First Degree Courses from Local Public Institutions 1995-2005 
Course 1995  %  2000  %  2005*  % 
Arts   44 886 59,3% 81 914 48,0%  103 846  42,5%
   Arts & Humanities  22 262   40 130    48 208   
   Economics & Business  20 072   37 875    50 522   
   Law   2 552   3 909    5 116   
Science   18 171 24,0% 49 575 29,0%  71 897  29,4%
   Medicine & Dentistry   3 738   6 908    8 656   
   Agriculture & Related Sciences   2 472   4 940    5 961   
   Pure Sciences  4 032   9 081    14 739   
Technical   12 652 16,7% 39 305 23,0%  68 784  28,1%
  Engineering   9 756   31 494    57 684   
  Architecture  1 397   4 682    7 920   
  Others   1 499   3 129    3 180   
 Total enrolled   75 709  100 % 170 794  100 %  244 527   100 %
           
Projections from Malaysian Plan 6, 7 and 8           
Source: Awang (2004) p 3             
                                                 
40 For an extensive review of these policy developments see Felker (2003)  
41 Rasiah (2002) p 16 
42 In 1998 just 0.4 % of the GDP was spent on R&D compared to 2.7 in South Korea and 2.9 in Japan, Awang (2003) p 5 
43 Between 1985-1995 only 500 per million in the population were trained scientist and engineers 
compared to 2639 in South Korea and 6309 in Japan, Awang (2003) p 5 
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That there is a strong demand for educated manpower is also reflected in the upgrading of the 
labour force structure that has been enabled by the expansion of education (see table 4.3 which 
shows a falling demand for simple production workers and an increased demand for the first three 
groups, the most educated ones). The expansion in industrial employment has tapped the 
countryside and the agricultural employment has fallen substantially since the 80s. 
 
Table 4.3: Employment by Major Occupational Group, 1989-2005 
   1989 1995 2000 2005* 
Professional, technical & related workers  7.5% 9.9% 11.0% 12.1% 
Administrative & Managerial workers  2.1% 3.2% 4.2% 5.0% 
Clerical & Related Workers  9.5% 10.9% 11.1% 11.2% 
Sales Workers  11.4% 10.9% 11.0% 11.3% 
Service Workers  11.4% 11.1% 11.8% 12.4% 
Production & Related Workers  29.3% 33.9% 32.8% 30.9% 
Agriculture Workers  28.9% 20.1% 18.1% 17.1% 
Total (thousands)  n.a 7 997.5 9 271.2 10 858.9 
      
*Projections from Malaysian Plan 6, 7 and 8      
Source: Awang (2004) p 3      
 
4.4 Wages and labour conditions  
 
Wage statistics for the zones are very fragmental so this survey is far from comprehensive. 
But the conditions in the Malaysian zones are generally better than the reputed conditions of 
EPZs in general. In the electronic industry EPZ wages tend to be higher than in the rest of the 
economy. In 1990 the average monthly wage in the zone was 920 compared to 709 RM 
outside. 
44 Previously, when the industry was less knowledge-intensive, the situation was 
reversed, but the long term tendency is that the wage gap is increasing. 
45 Generally, wages 
increased substantially in the early 90s but this all ended with the crisis when wages even 
contracted to eventually settle at a more moderate pace that would not risk their 
competitiveness (see tables 3.1 and 4.4). The wage ratio between unskilled and skilled 
production workers has remained virtually the same since the 70s, at around 60 percent 
which is remarkable considering that the wage premium should have gone up in the 90s 
following the upgrading of industry and increased demand for skilled labour. 
46
 
Table 4.4: Real Average Wage growth in manufacturing industries 1995-2003 
                            
Year  1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
Growth  20.9 4.4  5.9 -2.7 -1.7 12.9 3.5  4.9 4.4 
           
  Source: Malaysian Treasury (2004)      
                                                 
44 For real value of the RM see appendix. 
45 Sivalingam in Kusago, WB  (1998)  p 17  
46 Rasiah (2002a) p 39 
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Two of the main lure of the Malaysian EPZs have been the low wages and the weak unions. 
No national union is allowed and the Ministry of Human Resources has decided that only in-
house unions may be formed in the electronic sector. There are EPZ specific laws and 
regulations that restrict labour activities and protect companies against irresponsible unions. 
In addition, the Employment Act of 1955 also prohibits the use of strikes and lockouts in 
pioneer industries of vital interest. A low unionisation grade around 10 percent, (similar to the 
figures outside the zones) high turnover (15-20% per year) and little coordination between 
unions and Non Governmental Organisations (NGO) further limits the unions´ influence. 
47 
The main labour issues now are the refusal of the government to set minimum wages, the 
abolishing of the legislation that previously prohibited night work for women (to enable 





The common pattern of the EPZs in the developing world with a high share of young and 
unskilled women is not as obvious in Malaysia anymore. The female participation rate has fell 
substantially from 75 to 53.5 percent between 1980 and 1990, which is more in line with the 
common development in manufacturing outside the zone which went in the opposite direction 
from 35.6 to 47.2. This decreased participation rate was quite unique compared to other zones 
that has maintained rates over 70 percent.
 49 After the 80s the EPZ seem to follow the overall 
trend for the manufacturing sector with a knowledge increase in the 90s. However female 
participation overall and among the skilled seem to have fallen (the last from 59.4 to 51.4). 
Overall, there was no big difference between the men and women when it came to skilled, 
semiskilled and unskilled production workers (51, 48, 51 percent female participation rate, 
respectively 1997). 
50  Among professional, non-professional managerial,  technical and 
supervisory staff the female participation rate continually increased from around 5 percent at 
the start to over 20 percent 1997. To sum up, the industry has become more knowledge 
intensive as more skilled men have been employed. For the probable gender inequality when 
it comes to wages no data exists yet.
 51  
                                                 
47 Numbers comes from  Ahmadu (1998) 
48 Statements comes from Ahmadu (1998) 
49 Sivalingam in Kusago, (1998) p 9 
50 One thing to remember though is that the overall participation rate among people from 15 to 64 is 
much higher among men, around 50 percent, than women who linger at 30 percent so there is still a 
bias against women in manufacturing. Rasiah (2002a) p 38 
51 Rasiah (2002a) p 38 
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4.6 Ethnic policy and its consequences  
 
The NEP has, as mentioned, two pillars, namely poverty reduction and restructuring society to 
reduce inter-ethnic disparities. 
52 It was supposed to unite the country by reducing inter-ethnic 
resentment due to social-economic disparities. The first pillar containing poverty reduction 
has been uncontroversial and successful, wherefore the NEP has increasingly become 
involved with the restructuring of society. 
53 In practice, restructuring means increasing the 
Bumiputera (ethnical Malay) involvement in the economy by redistributing corporate 
ownership and expanding economic opportunities (increase employment and educational 
share of the Malays). This has been achieved by using public sector and state intervention 
extensively.  
 
The most debated issue has been over the failure to reach the targeted 30 percent for Malay 
ownership of the corporate sector, which has hovered around 18 percent since the 80s (up 
from 1.5 in 1969).
 54 By setting up a lot of public joint-venture enterprises (1,148 in 1987) the 
government tried to secure the Malay influence, but these policies have blurred the lines 
between politics and economics and it is now widely believed that wealth accumulation is 
crucially determined by political access and influence, rather than entrepreneur ability. The 
issue of wealth ownership only involves a small elite as reflected in the fact that 1.3 percent of 
the eligible Bumiputeras owned 75 percent of the shares. 
55 Recent policies of discretionary 
privatizations (part of the second round of export promotion in the eighties) have only 
increased the resentment and criticism of rent-seeking and cronyism and so has the selective 
nature of the bail-out process following the economical crisis 1997-98. 
56  
 
                                                 
52 The NEP has been implemented through the three Outline Perspective Plans (OPP), the first for 
1971-90, the second from 1991-2000 and the third from 2001-2010 
53 Although arbitrary and partly based on disclosed information, the proportion under the official 
poverty line went down from 49.3 to 16.5 and 7.5 in 1970 to 1990 and 1999 respectively thereby 
reaching the targets set in the OPP:s Jomo (2001) p 4-5 
54 The official figures here are questionable since they underestimate the real value, firstly it is only 
nominal share compared to actual stock share that was 34.5 percent in 1989; secondly, locally 
controlled companies are assumed to be non-Bumiputera and thirdly because foreign branches have 
been ignored. Jomo (2001) p 10-11 
55 The intention while starting the NEP was to let the “Bumiputera trust agencies” spread the influence 
over the corporate sector instead of concentrating it to individuals. Therefore the target in the OPP1 
was 82.7 percent trust share versus only 17.3 individual, in reality 91 percent was controlled by 
individuals in 1999. Jomo (2001) p 12 
56 The privatizations were inspired by the monetarist “counter-revolution” and they included major 
state-owned companies as Malaysian Airlines, Petronas, and the national lottery whom were sold off 
at substantial discounts to well connected businessman with links to the ruling Barisan Nasional Jomo 
(2001) p 24-25 
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When it comes to creating opportunities the NEP has been successful in changing the ethnical 
proportions in both lucrative professional occupations and social enrolment ratios. The 
Bumiputera share in those professions has gone up from 4.9 to 32 percent between 70 and 
1997 and was only severely underrepresented in “administrative and managerial” and in sales. 
As a matter of fact, the Malay was so over-represented in the public universities (up to 67 
percent in1985 from 40 percent in 1970) that there were controversies over their share of the 
public quota. 
57 Although the NEP has reached its goals, it is probably more down to higher 
growth levels than to specific economic policies, which have declined in influence over the 
economy as the economy has opened up. It is fairly clear that the economy would have 
expanded even more without these contra productive measures. However, some policies for 
economic justice seem inevitable as the “alternative is continued inequality, and perhaps more 
ominously, heightened and irresolvable ethnic conflict”. 
58 Sadly it seems like the NEP has 
played a part of the deteriorating inter-ethnical relations since the sixties. 
 
4.7 Principal incentives 
59
 
4.7.1 General Incentives 
 
Pioneer Status 
A company granted Pioneer Status enjoys a 5-year partial exemption from the payment of 
income tax. It will only have to pay tax on 30% of its statutory income. However, there are a 
few exceptions for which the government may consider more favourable tax relief on a case 
by case basis:  
-  Companies located in the States of Sabah and Sarawak and the designated “Eastern 
Corridor” of Peninsular Malaysia, will only have to pay tax on 15% of their statutory 
income. 
-  High technology companies engaged in promoted activities/products in areas of new 
and emerging technologies may receive a tax exemption of 100% for five years. 
-  Strategic projects or activities of national importance. They generally involve heavy 
capital investments with long gestation periods, have high levels of technology and are 
integrated, generate extensive linkages, and have significant impact on the economy. 
They may receive tax exemption of 100% of statutory income for a period of 10 years. 
                                                 
57 Jomo (2001) p 12-13 
58 Jomo (2001) p 22 
59 From MIDA 
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Investment Tax Allowance (ITA)  
A company granted ITA receives an allowance of 60% of qualifying capital expenditure 
incurred within five years from the date of approval of the project. Companies can offset this 
allowance against 70% of their statutory income in the year of assessment. Any unutilised 
allowance can be carried forward to subsequent years until fully utilised. The remaining 30% 
of statutory income is taxed at the prevailing company tax rate. As in the case of Pioneer 
Status companies, an additional incentive is enjoyed by promoted activities/products (the 
same exceptions as above). These companies can obtain an allowance of 80% of the 
qualifying capital expenditure incurred. The allowance can be utilised to offset 85% of their 
statutory income in the year of assessment.  
 
Reinvestment Allowance (RA) 
All manufacturing companies that have been in operation for at least 12 months and incur 
qualifying capital expenditure to expand production capacity, modernise and upgrade 
production facilities, diversify into related products, and automate its production facilities can 
obtain a Reinvestment Allowance (RA). The RA is 60% of qualifying capital expenditure 
incurred by the company and is given for a period of 15 yeas beginning from the year the 
first reinvestment is made. These can be prolonged under the rules of Accelerated Capital 
Allowance by an additional three years, of the initial allowance of 40% in the first year and 
annual allowances of 20%. 
 
4.7.2 Incentives for exports 
 
Tariff Related Incentives: Exemption from Import Duty and sales tax 
Full exemption from import duty can be considered on raw materials/components regardless 
of whether the finished products are meant for the export or domestic market. These 
exceptions can also be obtained on most machinery and equipment and on spares and 
consumables. 
 
Double Deduction on Export Credit Insurance Premiums 
To encourage exports to penetrate into non-traditional markets, double deduction is allowed 
for premium payments in respect of export credit insured with a company approved by the 
Ministry of Finance. 
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Double Deduction for the Promotion of Exports 
Certain expenses incurred by resident companies in looking for opportunities to export 
Malaysian manufactured and agricultural products and services qualify for double deduction.  
 
Industrial Building Allowance  
An annual allowance of 10% of qualifying capital expenditure applies to buildings used as 
warehouses for storing goods for export and re-export.  
 
4.7.3 Incentives for Research and Development 
 
A company which undertakes in-house research and development to further its business can 
apply for 50% ITA on qualifying capital expenditure incurred within 10 years. A company 
can enjoy double deduction on revenue (non-capital) expenditure for R&D which is directly 
undertaken and approved by the Ministry of Finance. 
 
4.7.4 Training incentives  
 
In order to encourage the upgrading of skills and capability, the following incentives are 
available: double deduction for approved training, deduction for pre-employment training, 
non-employee training and cash contributions. Also companies which incur expenditure on 




Generally, Malaysia’s policies to promote EPZs have been pretty successful, especially if you 
compare them to other countries that have embarked on the road to industrialisation through 
EPZs. But it was not until the launch of the Industrial Master Plan in 1985 that their path 
became economically sustainable. Since the early 90s the policies have shifted from just 
achieving high growth to upgrading the economy to export more sophisticated and profitable 
goods. However, as I have shown, Malaysia has had some serious problems in these aspects. 
Inequalities between the genders seems to have gone down somewhat. The ethnical policies 
have been successful in reaching socio-economical targets but have failed to improve the 
inter-ethnical relations. In the next section I will evaluate the direct impact that the EPZs have 
had on the Malaysian economy. 
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5. Direct effects of the EPZs 
 
Since there is limited information available about EPZs, because they are administrated 
locally by the states they are located in, (and the information does not seem to be compiled 
centrally) we have to look at other sources. Of the eleven Malaysian EPZs seven are devoted 
to electronics and account for 74.5 percent (1979) of the employment in the zones, and since 
at least 80 percent has to be exported, only very export oriented industries can be considered. 
60 Because the electrical industry most often correlates with the EPZs and because zones 
generally tend to breed a monoculture of industries, there is a good case for studying it when 
you want to know more about the Malaysian EPZs. 
 
The electronic industry has been a remarkable success story and has gone from being a tiny 
industry in the 70s to dominate the manufacturing industry with around 35 percent of the 
employment and 69 percent of the export, which brought in 60 percent of total foreign 
earnings.
61 The industry has been able to grow much since it fits well into the international 
growth pattern of EPZs in developing countries. It is a big industry internationally which has 
made the clustering effects substantial. It is also relatively labour intensive as can be seen in 
table 5.1 and not highly capital intensive, which would be hard for a developing country to 
afford. With the accelerated globalisation (read increased fragmentation) in the 70s and 80s 
many industries were undergoing structural changes trying to cut costs (read labour costs) 
which also favoured this industry that increasingly became outsourced to developing countries 











                                                 
60 UNCTAD (1997) p 13 
61 MIDA (2003) and Malaysian Treasury (2004) 
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Table 5.1: Manufacturing Employment 1998, Employment per enterprise and Capital/Labour 
        
Sector Employment  %  Empl/Enterpr.* C/L* 
Electrical and electronics  332 297 35.10%  144  269 606 
Textiles products  90 310 9.50%  81  126 718 
Wood products  81 847 8.70%  114  131 743 
Food manufacturing  57 975 6.10%  70  204 136 
Rubber products  53 911 5.70%  131  123 804 
Transport Equipment  38 636 4.10%  88  424 121 
Plastic products  35 261 3.70%  63  162 088 
Non-metallic products  34 861 3.70%  56  643 964 
Fabricated metal products  34 189 3.60%  68  135 071 
Paper, printing and publishing  29 609 3.10%  7  596 952 
Miscellaneous  157 076 16.60%  57  495 788 
Total/average  945 972 100.00% 91  404 787 
*Refer to approved projects between 1998-2003       
Source: MIDA (2003)         
 
5.1 Growth development in Electronics  
 
This industry
62 is dominated by big Multinational Companies and geared towards exports. 
The slowdown in growth between 1995-1997 (see table 5.2) was partly caused by one of their 
main trade partners (Japan), which sharply depreciated its currency at the time, making the 
Malaysian Ringgit (RM) overvalued. The Asian crisis hit Malaysia in June 1997 and the 
currency depreciated 55.4 percent against the dollar before it was pegged at 3.8 to the dollar 
in September 1998.
63 Although the aggregated growth for Malaysia contracted by 7.36 
percent in 1998 the growth of the electronic industry picked up some speed again with 24.6 
percent from a mere 12.6 the previous year (see table 5.2). The reason is of course the many 
MNCs that are part of an integrated international production system (one-third of the world 
trade consists of such intra-firm trade and even higher in the electronic industry) and therefore 
have been able to take advantage of the decreased cost and wages derived from the stronger 
foreign currencies.
 64
                                                 
62 The Malaysian EE industry essentially consists of two related industries. The electronics industry is 
defined as the production of “equipment whose functioning is based on the manipulation of electrical 
signals/impulses and/or components of such equipment”. The electrical industry produces equipment 
which “generates, stores and transmits electrical power or transforms electrical energy into other forms 
of energy”. MIDA (1990) 
63 UNCTAD (1998) 
64 UNCTAD (1998) 
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The crisis also increased the productivity levels (see table 5.2) and created new investment 
opportunities, which increased foreign investments, after the shock effect ceased, from a 
severe drop in 1997-98 (see table 5.2). This growth path continued until 2001 when then 
worldwide demand for electronics declined. Altogether this period (1997-03) was volatile and 
did not follow the steady growth path of the three previous decades. Despite a high annual 
average growth of 9.6 percent no expansion in employment opportunities has occurred. 
However this is still much better than the rest of the domestic economy and the industry will 
continue to be the leading one. 
 
Table 5.2: Malaysia’s Electronic Industry, 1992-2003 
        
Year Employment Growth Productivity* Import/Export 
1992 204 000 23.4% 157 843 73.7% 
1993 231 000 30.7% 182 251 70.4% 
1994 278 000 34.0% 202 878 73.9% 
1995 313 000 25.9% 226 837 75.1% 
1996 329 100 7.0% 230 933 74.2% 
1997 343 300 12.6% 249 345 70.1% 
1998 341 700 24.6% 312 262 63.1% 
1999 382 000 21.6% 339 791 61.1% 
2000 423 600 28.7% 394 476 67.4% 
2001 355 800 -13.6% 405 846 66.9% 
2002 345 500 -5.4% 395 369 73.6% 
2003 360 048 7.7% 408 557 75.5% 
        
* Output Per Worker      
Source: MIDA (2003 ) 
 
5.2 Foreign Direct Investments 
 
The electronic industry has been able to capture the lion’s share of the FDI in Malaysia (see 
table 5.3). But you can also reflect on the dependency on the international corporations as 
slowdowns of the worldwide demand for electronic products have affected the investments 
much more than in other Malaysian industries (the oil industry was not as badly affected by the 
Asian crisis). 
Table 5.3: Sector share of the total Malaysian FDI (Million of RM) 
           
Sector/year 1996  1997  1998  1999  2000  2001  2002 
Electronic   54% 25% 15% 48% 51% 50%  35%
Oil & gas  4% 37% 16% 26% 16% 1%  41%
Chemical  12% 6% 32% 2% 3% 4%  4%
Other %  30% 32% 37% 24% 29% 45%  20%
Total  17 057  11 473 13 064 12 274 19 849 18 907  11 578
Source: MIDA and Malaysian Treasury various years 
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Just how international this industry really is, is very well captured in the investments statistics 
and as can be seen in table 5.4, the foreign share has in some years been as high as 92.1. But the 
aggregate investment seems to follow the FDI trend and is not as mobile so the downturns are 
not quite as bad (which cause the FDI to react faster to demand fluctuations)  
 
Table 5.4: Foreign Direct Investments in the Electronic industry (Million of RM)   
         
Electronics*  1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 
Foreign investments  8995 2730 1422 5947 10210 9509 4005
Capital Investments  11816 5392 1653 7032 12182 10325 5651
Share of FDI  76.13% 50.63% 86.03% 84.56% 83.81% 92.10% 70.88%
         
* From 1999 Electrical and electronic products are included 
Source: MIDA and Malaysian treasury, various years      
 
The main source of foreign investment in Malaysia is the USA with 27 percent. Other big 
investors are Japan, Singapore and Germany with 15, 12 and 10, respectively, of the FDI (for 
comparison see figure 5.1).
65 Suppose that these figures were representative for the electronic 
industry; then they would not be surprising considering the structure of the industry which is 
dominated by large MNCs. The deeper cooperation in the region with arrangements that are 
moving towards the FTA (among others are the ASEAN Free Trade Agreement, AFTA) with 
assurance of market access and reduction of trade barriers has facilitated an emerging trade 
pattern of fragmentation of production and more vertical specialisation. The fact that the FDI 
comes from almost the same countries that are the electronic industry´s main markets for export 
suggests that regional intra-firm trade might be high (compare figure 5.1 and table 5.5).  
 
    














Source: Malaysian treasury 2004
 
                                                 
65 Since country based FDI figures for the electronic industry have been hard to obtain I have chosen 
to analyse the aggregate figures for the whole economy, this is not to say that these figure necessarily 
correlate exactly. 
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5.3 Exports 
 
The total manufacturing exports almost doubled from 1996 to 2000 but seem to have levelled 
out at fairly high levels around 300,000 million RM. The electronic industry export was 
responsible for almost all of that growth, but since the peak of 2000 has lost almost 5 
percentage points and now only accounts for 65.6 percent of the total exports (see figure 5.2). 
Another trend is that imports, as a share of the exports for the industry, went up from 61.1 to 
75.5 percent
66 between 1999-2003, which suggests that the local content has gone down and 
that MNCs are sourcing their input from their regional affiliates (another factor that points to 
an increasing regional fragmentation trend). 
                   









1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
Electronics exports Total manufactured exports
Source: Treasury Malaysia 2003
      
 
As mentioned before the share of exports is following the same trend as the FDI, but another 
thing to note is that more than a third of the market is spread out to other countries, which 
suggests that this is a competitive industry that has made it into markets all over the world. 
  Table 5.5: Export Markets for E & E 1999-2003 
     
%  Country 
  27.4%  United States 
18.8%  Singapore   
9.8%  Japan 
  6.2%  Hong Kong 
3.4%  China    
34.4%  Others 
  100.0%  Total 
  
Source: Bank Negara Annual Report (2003)  
                                                 
66 MIDA (2003) 
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5.4 Export as a contributor of foreign exchange earnings 
 
Although the Malaysian EPZ record in promoting gross exports has been impressive, the 
benefits to the host economy might not have been so high. This is because production in the 
EPZs has a high import content. The benefits to the host economy from foreign exchange 
earnings arise when firms convert foreign currency into local to pay for local purchases and 
wages, but “Zones in Malaysia are highly focused on the electronics industry and local 
purchases constituted only a small percentage of the total”.
67 So instead of gross export you 
have to look at the net export. Figure for Malaysia on this is hard to obtain but 
Jayanthakumaran estimates it to be as low as 33 percent (1978) of gross export and claims it 
has remained virtually the same. However, Warr´s cost benefit-analysis for the Penang EPZ 
estimated the foreign exchange earnings to be 94 million US dollars 1982 or 38.6 percent of 
the total benefits (where employment is the other major benefit which contributed 45.6 
percent, see table 2.2).  
 
5.5 Summary of findings 
 
There is reason to suspect that the economy is reaching (or has already reached) a fifth 
developmental stage (see table 4.1) that differs somewhat from the previous era because the 
industry does not create jobs as it used to do, but has instead become more knowledge-intense 
with higher productivity levels (see chapter four for the means to upgrade the economy to this 
stage). This trend is also reflected in investments and exports that have limped since the peak 
in 2000. This is probably linked with the regional fragmentation trend which will only 
become stronger as the implementation of AFTA progresses (as more countries and more 
products become affected). Politically, these tendencies may be hard to deal with as Malaysia 
may perhaps have to give up market shares to its competitors as trade barriers decrease. In the 
next section I intend to look at the indirect effects.  
 
                                                 
67 Jayanthakumaran (2003) p 13  
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6. Indirect effects                                                                                
 
6.1 Backward Linkages and technology transfers
68   
 
 
In order to acquire information about these effects, we have to focus our search on the micro 
level since development has differed in the various regions of Malaysia. There are three major 
regions for the electronic industry that have developed since the early 70s: the Chinese 
dominated Penang, the capital region of Klang Valley and that of Singapore, which have 
positively affected the Johor state and they are all roughly of the same size. 
69 The federal 
policy has generally been biased towards large and foreign industries so the local cluster 
development has only taken place when the local state has been proactive. The creation of 
backward linkage and spill over effects (see section 2.2) between the MNC and the domestic 
sector depends to a large degree on how big the technology gap is and to what extent the local 
state has been able to bridge it over. This is because:  
“MNC is badly positioned to identify small scale and medium firms potential 
capabilities as it would require detailed scrutiny and monitoring. They themselves 
have received little encouragement to participate in such developments, which can 
be risky and uncertain…small firms on the other hand face financial problems 
including accessing subsidized loans and technical assistance and are hardly 





The only state that has been able to bridge this gap is the Penang state in the north. Penang 
has been doing so by pursuing a proactive systematic coordination policy that has accelerated 
the inter-firm links, and created a strong supplier network which has been able to increase the 
localisation of inputs. In 1998 the local sourcing of the total purchase was 40-50 percent in 
consumer industries and 20-40 percent in electronic components, and the Penang region had 
raised its share of total manufacturing output from 13 to 46 percent between 1971 and 2000.
71 
Most Penang supplier firms have reached the third or fourth stage of technology absorption 
                                                 
68To obtain statistics for this chapter has been hard so I have chosen to base it on various surveys made 
of Rajah Rasiah that may not always be complete.   
69 Penang is the largest with over 90,000 employed, followed by the Klang Valley with 85,000 and 
Johor with nearly 80,000 in 1995, Rasiah (1999)  p 6 
70 Rasiah (1999) p 5 
71 Rasiah & Best (2003) p 42  
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and diffusion, which means that they have begun to adapt and reverse engineering imported 
machinery for their own use, and developed their own original equipment manufacturing 
capabilities to supply the MNC (third stage). This is in sharp contrast to firms elsewhere in 
Malaysia, which still perform low-end activities with imported machinery and design (first 
stage), or in rare cases have upgraded to use imported assembly semi automated machinery 
(second stage). The fourth and final stages in this categorisation are when they are able to 
introduce their own design while still oriented to supplying MNCs. The active state agency 
Penang Development Corporation (PDC), that has made the mentioned progress possible, has 
not only coordinated the cooperation but sustained the growth by seeking new industrial 
specialities from Silicon Valley, Japan and Taiwan. It was able to differentiate and diversify 
the production away from just massproduction operations of semiconductors and components 
in the early 70s to telecommunication components and equipment, audio video equipment in 
the late 70s and disk drives and computer assemblies in the 90s.
72 The MNCs have played a 
major role as a training ground for technical and skilled personal to gain critical tacit and 
experimental experience for new firm creation. Globetronics, Shinca, Unico are all example 
of local entrepreneurs that have gained their experience from working for MNC. The 
technology transfer has been very impressive so the local ancillary firms linked to the 
electronic industry has increased from 45 firms 1989 to 155 firms in 1993 and 455 in 2001.
73 
Despite this impressive performance the lack of high-tech human capital has restricted 
Penang´s capacity to attract high value-added activities such as R&D and new product 
development. Their invitation strategy has worked well since demand for science and 
engineering capital has not been high for assembly test and redesigning activities. However 
this will not be the case if they want to continue expanding (see section 4.3). 
 
6.1.2 Klang Valley 
 
In the beginning the Klang Valley (consisting of the four states Selangor, Negeri Sembilan, 
Melaka and the federal capital Kuala Lumpur) was the main place for foreign firms to locate 
their subsidiary firms. The region has indeed created a large production capability in 
consumer electronics and related components, so the scope for clustering (and the beneficial 
effects from that) would appear to be substantial.  However, the region is more like a loose 
agglomeration of firms and institutions than a prospering cluster like the Penang region. 
                                                 
72 Rasiah (2002) p 24 
73 Rasiah (2002) p 26 
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The reason for this is that the regional agencies have been comparatively passive in promoting 
regional dynamism or as a managing director of Motorola explained in 1995: 
 
“We are for greater sourcing as that would raise our productive flexibility and lower 
costs. But private firms generally do not individually search and canvass for greater 
inter-firm collaboration and sourcing. It was possible in Penang because of the 
dynamic role of PDC, which created deliberation councils and took on a proactive 
role of promoting and matching firms”.
74
 
So in that aspect it comes as no surprise that only 2-10 percent has been sourced locally. 
Knowledge transfer in inter-firm training relationships involving MNCs has also been limited 
and what does exist comes from business councils representing foreign countries (examples 
include JETRO for Japan and the American Business Council). Their efforts have seldom 
gone beyond national interest and therefore lack cross-national coordination and consequently 
generate little spillover effects to the local economy. The lack of systematic relations between 
firms and institutions has also limited the transfer of knowledge developed in MNC by 
entrepreneurial professionals and technical personnel, to start new firms in the region 





The electronic industry in Johor has progressed relatively recently from the outsourcing of 
labour intensive production in Singapore and the formation of the Singapore-Johor-Riau 
(SIJORI) growth triangle in 1989. It has created a high production capability in computer 
peripheral and consumer electronics assembly, although they it at the bottom of the value 
chain (due to rising wage costs, the industry has became more automated). As in Klang Valley 
the companies in this region have seldom gone beyond the first stage of technology transfer, 
and the sourcing pattern is similar to those in the central state because of the low capabilities 
of the local and indigenous suppliers. Other similarities with the Selangor region are the lack 
of state support which has prevented the establishment of information and co-ordination 
networks between firms and institutions. Instead the region has been relying on Singapore for 
such efforts, or as an official from Johor state development corporation put it:
                                                 
74 Rasiah & Best (2003) p 43 
75 Rasiah has done a series of interviews that shows these kind of personnel has generally remained in 
their old firms in the Klang Valley (2002) p 37 
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 “Singapore spends heavily on promotion, while we absorb some of the synergies 
because of our close location and the division of labour that has emerged in the 
industry…  Our activities do not stretch to co-ordinating firms activities. We only do 
that when we have equity participation in the firms. As for others, we see it as 
getting too involved in activities outside our area. If firms establish strong linkages 
in Johor, that is good for us. But it should come from firms´ own initiatives”
76. 
 
Therefore, there has generally been low professional turnaround and the bigger successful 
local firms tend to operate without production links with MNC and few former MNC 
employees have started up new firms. The local sourcing is reported to be only 15 percent and 




6.2 Catalytic effects 
 
As revealed in the objectives for a free trade zone section (2.2), the catalytic effect can be 
separated into two different but related areas, namely on micro and macro level. The micro 
level deals with the role of the MNC and its ability to spur the domestic firms to become more 
export oriented. This is closely connected to the linkage and learning effects that were 
discussed in this chapter. The macro level deals with the effect the EPZ has on overall trade 
policy in the country. 
 
6.2.1 EPZ as a catalyst on the micro level 
 
As stated, the situation in Malaysia is not homogeneous as it differs in the different states. The 
learning effects have been strongest where the local state efficiently encouraged has 
cooperation between MNCs and local companies as in Penang. Elsewhere in Malaysia the 
development has not been as promising, but it is still clear that the domestic companies have 
been able to develop faster by greater interaction with MNCs, and by being exposed to 




                                                 
76 Rasiah (1999)  p 16 
77 Rasiah (1999)  p 15 
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6.2.2 EPZ as a catalyst on trade policies 
 
When first introduced, the primary aims of the zones were to earn foreign exchange and 
create jobs by promoting manufacturing export. But the incredible success of the zones and 
the disappointing experiences with the second round of import substitution in the early 
eighties have likely affected Malaysia’s trade policies towards more openness.
78 In an attempt 
to detect and measure possible catalystic effects, Johansson and Nilsson used a gravity model 
to evaluate the effects of EPZs on exports.
 79 In their results they distinguish between two 
different groups of countries that have implemented EPZ successfully (in terms of attracting 
FDI and creating employment). The groups follow Madani´s terminology in section 2.3 where 
one group has followed outward oriented trade policies
80 and the other has pursued more 
protective strategies.
81 Only in the first group has the EPZ had a significant positive impact on 
exports,
 82 which seems to be a justification that an open trade regime and favourable micro 
characteristics facilitate a beneficial impact of EPZs on export. When they continue their 
studies they come to the conclusion that Malaysia has had a positive catalytic effect, although 
stable during the eighties (in theory this effect is expected to increase as the zones become 
more integrated into the economy). Although this may be a premature conclusion, it looks like 
the catalytic effect may have increased recently (see figure 5.2) as the non-electronics share 
has gone up for five consecutive years. 
                                                 
78 This trend was inspired by Thatcher/Reagan policies that dominated the world politics at the time 
79 Johansson & Nilsson (1997) 
80 Consisting of countries like Hongkong, Malaysia and Mauritius 
81 Consisting of Dominican Republic and Mexico 
82 Note that these results could be fragile and may be caused by other circumstances than the measured 
ones, Johansson and Nilsson (1997) p 2122 
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7. Summary and conclusions 
 
The purpose of this essay has been to study and evaluate the development of the Malaysian 
EPZs and their effects on the host economy. This goes beyond the original narrow objectives 
that the Zones once were created for, namely to create urban industrial jobs for mainly 
Bumiputera and earn some foreign exchange. Of course the question of whether the zones 
have been successful or not depends on what objectives one emphasizes and the relative 
importance one gives to them.  
 
I started this paper by trying to explain what EPZs are and to put them in context. The EPZ is 
not a new phenomenon but its lure has increased as more countries have found a way to 
develop their industries through them. The main reason for their resurgence of the EPZ in 
Asia (where most of the successful EPZs are created) is the increasing production 
fragmentation trend which has sliced up the production chain and enabled increased 
specialisation in various countries. Lower trade barriers mitigated through various trade 
agreements such as WTO and AFTA, have probably also speeded up this process. In chapter 
four did I brought up the emergence of the Malaysian EPZs with its historical background. I 
also dealt with various issues of major concern when these zones progressed beyond their 
original objectives. In this section I tried to highlight that the Malaysian EPZs in most aspects 
have been role models and that creation from the global civil society has mostly been 
unfounded (with the possibly exception of the harsh labour conditions). It is also worth noting 
that the controversial ethnical policies have largely been unproductive.  
 
In chapter five I examined the direct effects of the EPZs. They have been a huge success since 
they started and continued to be so during the period of study. The electronic industry hugely 
dominates the whole economy with over 60 percent of total foreign exchange and 35 percent 
of manufacturing employment (see section five). Although this might be a satisfactory 
achievement on its own, it is not clear whether the zones have helped to develop the host 
country, or if the effects are lasting in the new light of product fragmentation. In chapter six I 
looked at the important indirect effects that have been considerable compared to experiences 
elsewhere, but they are still disappointing overall. Learning effects and backward linkages are 
limited (and mostly concentrated to the “Silicon island” of Penang) and the country has, 
despite great efforts by the government, experienced serious problems in upgrading the 
industry. However, there are positive signs that they are slowly progressing. The most 
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important indirect effect is probably the catalytic effect the EPZs have had on the Malaysian 
trade policies that have gradually become more and more open. Remember from the theory 
section 2.3 that the EPZs are only a second best alternative compared to free trade.  
 
The product fragmentation trend and the newly created free trade area, AFTA, have changed 
the prerequisites for EPZs in Southeast Asia and their role will be different in the future. Not 
so much attention will be given to EPZs as such as to their cluster fostering effect that will 
continue to attract companies. If these clusters could be developed, all the indirect effects 
would be fulfilled. Therefore, similar policies are required. Rasiah & Best point out a few key 
areas in the electronic industry for entrepreneurs and policy makers to address:  
 
      -    Create dynamic firms – innovative firms that learn and teach other firms 
-  Build production capabilities  
-  Build network capabilities  
-  Technology Management – to coordinate different segments in the value chain as only 
the MNC has been able to do so far. 
-  Technology transition – to coordinate and mobilize investment decisions in key areas.  
-  Skill formation – it can not be emphasised enough how important education is.  
-  Integration of government efforts - like the Penang state has been good at. 
 
Malaysia has identified and addressed some of these issues in the various Malaysian plans but 
great effort is still required if they are going to be solved, and if Malaysia is going to develop 
in to an advanced country as formulated in their ambitious “Vision 2020” plan (This plan was 
formulated in the OPP2 in 1991). For utilization of the economy’s full potential a review of 
discriminating ethnic laws has to take place as well. 
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•  In Selangor: Teluk Panglima Garang*, Sungei Way*, Ampang Hulu Kelang* 
•  In Sarawak: Sama Jaya 
•  In Perak: Kinta Phases 1 & 11, Jelapang 
•  In Penang: Bayan Lepas*, Prai*, Prai Whart* Tanjung Gelang 
•  In Malacca: Batu Berendam*, Tanjung Kling 
•  In Johore: Johor Port Authority EPZ  
 
* Electronic dominated 
Source: Government of Malaysia (2001) 
                                                 




Peninsular (Western) Malaysia  
   





Note that these are the Malaysian names but the English names are the same except for:  
Pulau Penang = Penang 
Wilayah Persekutan = Putra Jaya (Federal state) 
Melaka = Malacca 
 
Source: Travel.com  
 